INSAP: 通涨率或达6.6% BNM 会升息或加息吗？

家里蹲国仙

大马策略分析与政策研究所（INSAP）
柴油零售价格在 7周内暴涨124.7%。
对食品供应链造成冲击，成本逐步转嫁给消费者。

中文链接：https://www.enanyang.my/news/20260415/Finance/1222635

跟英文版有出入的地方："If the RON95 subsidy is removed, it could add more than six percentage points to inflation, on top of existing pressures,"

家里蹲国仙

Here is the translation of your DeepSeek response into BBCode format:

Short answer: No.

The projected 6.1–6.6% inflation is driven by a supply-side shock (diesel costs, food supply chain) and the RON95 subsidy cap does not offset broader cost pass-through. Raising interest rates would do little to address these non-demand factors, while risking a sharper slowdown. BNM would likely hold rates and rely on fiscal tools (e.g., targeted subsidies, GST reintroduction) instead of a symbolic hike that doesn't match the root cause.

You're highlighting a key point from the INSAP report.

If the RON95 subsidy were removed, the direct and indirect inflationary impact is estimated at >6 percentage points on top of the already projected 6.1–6.6% headline inflation. That would push total inflation into the 12–13% range — a level not seen in Malaysia for decades.

From a monetary policy perspective, that changes the calculus:

• Without subsidy removal → current 6.1–6.6% is largely supply-driven → rate hike is low-impact, high-cost.
• With subsidy removal → inflation becomes both supply-driven and fiscal-policy-induced → expectations could become unanchored → BNM would likely need to hike rates aggressively — not once, but multiple times — to show action and contain inflation expectations.
  

So my earlier "No" on a rate hike assumed the subsidy stays. If the government actually removes the RON95 subsidy, then yes, BNM would almost certainly raise rates — not once, but multiple times — to show action and contain inflation expectations.

家里蹲国仙

ChatGPT:

Short answer: Yes — if inflation is projected sustainably above target (6.1–6.6% vs BNM’s ~2–3% target) and is driven by structural cost pressures, a rate hike would be the conventional monetary policy response to signal action and anchor inflation expectations.

如果 Food & Non-Alcoholic Beverages 权重约 29.5%，而它本身就能把 headline inflation 推到 6.1%–6.6%，那说明整体通胀压力已经不低。

接下来如果 RON95 补贴不足 / 油价开始传导到运输成本（交通、物流、外食成本），通常会再推高 CPI。

推测 Malaysia Headline CPI（包含交通油价冲击）

大概率区间：7.0% – 8.5%

• 温和情境（补贴部分顶住）：约 6.6% – 7.2%
• 中等情境（油价传导明显）：约 7.2% – 8.0%
• 严重情境（补贴退坡 + 供应链继续恶化）：约 8.0% – 9.0%
  

结论：如果油价冲击叠加食品供应链问题，Malaysia CPI 上 7% 是很现实的。

家里蹲国仙

Gemimi:

Yes. If headline inflation is projected to reach 6.1% to 6.6%—well above the typical 2% to 3% comfort zone—and is driven by structural pressures like food supply chain disruptions, a rate hike becomes necessary to anchor inflation expectations.

While Petronas securing fuel supply through June 2026 provides temporary relief by delaying price shocks at the pump, it does not address the underlying food-driven inflation. A rate hike would serve as a signal of proactive monetary policy to prevent "second-round effects," where high costs become embedded in wages and services, potentially spiraling out of control.

家里蹲国仙

Claude

不，我不会改变立场。

即便INSAP预测今年通胀高达6.1–6.6%，我的答案仍是暂不加息，原因如下：

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核心判断：这是供给侧通胀，不是需求侧通胀。

• 通胀主要由食品供应链驱动，而非消费过热或信贷膨胀。
• 加息只能压制需求，无法修复食品供应链，政策工具用错了对象。
• Petronas燃油供应延至6月底，说明供给压力本身有望逐步缓解。
  

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"做样子加息"的代价太高：

一次象征性加息（+25bps）不足以拉低6%+的通胀，却会：

• 推高房贷还款压力
• 打击中小企业借贷
• 释放经济放缓信号，动摇市场信心
  

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我会采取的替代行动：

发表强硬声明，明确若通胀于Q3仍未回落，将启动加息周期——以预期管理代替仓促行动。

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结论：为行动而行动是最差的央行决策。公信力来自正确判断，而非迎合压力的姿态。

这改变了一切。立场调整：支持加息一次。

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为什么这个信息是关键转折点：

若RON95补贴取消，通胀将从6.1–6.6%跳升至12%以上。这已不再是单纯的供给侧冲击——

燃油价格全面传导至运输、食品、生产成本，将引发二轮通胀效应（second-round effects），工资压力随之上升，通胀预期开始失锚。

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此时加息的逻辑成立：

[th]情景变化[/th][th]政策含义[/th]
通胀超过12%已超出"供给冲击"范畴，需求管理工具必须介入
二轮效应风险必须在预期失控前发出强烈信号
令吉贬值压力加息有助稳定资本流动与汇率

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但我的加息是有条件的：

• 仅加一次 +25bps，同时明确声明这是预防性而非紧缩周期的开始
• 同步向政府施压：补贴改革须配合定向援助（如BR1M式现金补贴），否则央行单独承担政治代价不公平
• 保留数据依赖的后续选项
  

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结论：

我之前坚持不加息，是因为问题属于供给侧。但补贴全面取消是系统性冲击，性质已变——这一次，加息是负责任的选择，不是政治表演。

Engineer

目前不可能升息